EXCULPATORY PROVISIONS IN
STOP-PAYMENT FORMS
,--HE COMPLEXITY of the modern banking system has led to
A a universal inclusion in banking forms of provisions which purport
to relieve the banks from the more rigorous applications of the high
standards of care and diligence imposed upon them by the common
law.' Although such exculpatory provisions as relate to the collection of
deposited items,2 the correctness of statements of accounts,' and the
payment of funds to holders of savings account passbooks, 4 have almost
uniformly been held not to bar liability for negligence, 5 exculpatory
For a general discussion see i MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING §§ I89 -z12A (6th ed.
(permanent ed. 195o).
2 See generally 2 PATON'S DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS 1247 et seq. (revised ed.

1928) 5 5A MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING § 167

1942) .
3 See, e.g., Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Home Savings Bank, iSo Cal. 6oI, x1z
(bank liable for payment of checks drawn on depositor to fictitious
Pac. 293 (g99)
payees, despite depositor's failure to notify bank of irregularities within ten days as per
provision in statement).
4 See Note, 5 A.L.R. 1203 (2920).
Although provisions in bank collection forms and deposit slips making the collecting bank the depositor's agent have been unheld, such provisions have generally not
been allowed to cause a reduction in the standard of care required of the collecting
agent. 6 MICHIE, supra note x, §§ 13, 59; 2 PATON, supra note 2, at 1257, 1366.
But commercial banks usually provide in their passbooks that the depositor must
examine his statement and returned checks and notify the bank within a certain number
of days of any error or mispayment in order to have a valid claim against the bank.
But cJ. Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Home
5 B MICHIE, 'slpra note 1, § 321.
Savings Bank, xio Cal. 6oi, i8z Pac. 293 (i919), where it was held that a depositor is
not bound to know the indorsers of his checks; thus there may be a later questioning of
the forged indorsement. The courts have also applied the general rule that even
if a depositor does not examine his returned checks and balance sheet, if the bank
was negligent in the payment of a forged check, the account may be questioned. E.g.,
Wussaw v. Badger State Bank, 204 Wis. 467, 234. N.W. 720 (1931); Union Tool
Co. v. Farmers' and Merchants' Nat'l Bank of Los Angeles, 29z Cal. 4o, 218 Pac. 424
(1923); Notes, 103 A.L.R. 2247 (936), 75 A.L.R. :283 (x x), 67 A.L.R. 22
The
I8 A.L.R. 887 (1922), x5 A.L.R. 159 (29z), ix A.L.R. 586 (92x).
(930),
courts have almost uniformly held that there can be no contractual removal of the
duty of ordinary care by the bank to prevent payment to an unauthorized person. See,
e.g., Kummel v. Germania Savings Bank, 127 N.Y. 488, 28 N.E. 398 (1891); Chase v.
Waterbury Savings Bank, 77 Conn. 295, 59 Atl. 37 (1904). But cf. Appleby v. Erie
County Savings Bank, 62 N.Y. :2 (1875); Dinini v. Mechanics' Savings Bank of
Winsted, 85 Conn. 225, 8z Atl. 58o (292). Generally, even though the depositor has
himself been negligent in letting his passbook fall into the hands of an unauthorized person, if the bank by ordinary care could have determined that the person presenting the
passbook was unauthorized, it is liable for payment. See Note, S A.L.R. 1203 (192o).
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provisions in stop-payment order forms, somewhat inexplicably, have
generally been accorded full force and effect." A recent decision,7 several dicta,8 and the provisions of the new Uniform Commercial Code
have, however, cast some doubt upon the settled character of this latter
proposition, and a re-examination of the problem, therefore, would seem
to be not amiss.
Many early exculpatory provisions in stop-payment order forms did
not unequivocally emorace negligent payment, and, accordingly, the
courts, reluctant under any circumstances to honor releases from liability for negligence, generally construed them strictly against the
banks. Thus, a release which stated that an endeavor would be made
to execute all stop-payment orders was held not to absolve a negligent
bank from liability, since the assent of the depositor was said to have
been obtained by an invitation which implied an exercise of care on the
part of the bank.'
Although more precise drafting obviated this particular judicial
gambit, the courts had other strings to their bows. Lack of mutual
assent was frequently sought, found, and asserted as the basis for denying operative effect to otherwise unconditional releases. Thus, where
the depositor had neither read the exculpatory provision nor had it
called to his attention, some courts facilely decided that he had not assented to it and that it was therefore nugatory." This rationale, however, runs counter to the generally accepted contract doctrine that one
is bound by the terms of his contract even though he has not read it 12
and most courts, unwilling to upset so firm a doctrine, have held that
the assent of the depositor must be implied from his act of signing the
stop-payment order.' 3
Another more durable rationale which has also been widely employed by the courts to avoid releases in stop-payment orders is that
of failure of consideration. Thus, in one case where no mention of the
exculpatory provision had been made to the depositor when he opened
'BRirrrON,
BILLS AND NOTES § i81 ( 943) Notes, i A.L.R.2d 1155 (1948),
A.L.R. 8, 79-82 (z948), 9 A.L.R. 1o69 (192o).
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"Thomas v.First Nat'l Bank of Scranton, 376 Pa. 181, iox A.2d 9io (1954) ,
reversing, 173 Pa. Super. 2o5, 96 A.zd 196 (1953). See text at note 36 et seq. infra.
' Reinhardt v.Passaic Clifton Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 16 N.J. Super. 430, 436, 84
A.2d 741, 744 (x95x), aff'd, 9 N.J. 607, 89 A.2d 242 (1952).
§§ 4-103(),
4-202.
" Elder v. Franklin Nat'l Bank of New York, 25 Misc. 716, 55 N.Y. Supp.
576 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
" See, e.g., the Elder case ibid.
"23 CosRBrN, CONTRACrS § 607 (1950). But cf. Los Angeles Investment Co. v.
' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

Home Savings Bank, 1So Cal. 6ox, 182 Pac. 293 (.9-9).
"5 See, e.g., Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N.E. 782

(1920).
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his account, but a subsequent stopping of payment was conditioned upon
his assent to that provision, the court found only a nudum pacturn. reasoning that the bank, upon accepting the account, had become obligated
to stop payment on any countermanded check and to bear the loss of
any payment made despite the depositor's order.1 4 The judicial following of this rationale, however, has been curtailed by several factors.
Where the account passbook issued to the depositor advises of the
exculpatory provision, many courts have not been troubled by the consideration problem, since the release can be held a part of the depositor's contract with the bank'4-for, unlike a common carrier,"' a bank is
not bound to accept an account and may impose conditions prerequisite
to such acceptance. Further, in Pennsylvania, where the Model Written Obligations Act 7 has been adopted, the mere inclusion in the stoppayment order form of a recital that the depositor intends to be legally
bound by the release will effectively substitute for consideration.' And
the Connecticut court has indicated that there would be adequate consideration for an exculpatory provision if the bank would inform the
depositor, when he seeks to stop payment, that he must either use the
form with the release or lose his account.' 9 This latter view has received
no other sanction, however, and in any event would seem applicable
only to future stop-payment orders.
Apart from their technical legal bases, the primary policy underlying the decisions holding these releases valid seems to be the preservation of freedom of contract. It was on this ground that the New York
Court of Appeals in Gaita v. Windsor Bank,2 ° rejected its historic position
that a release from liability for negligence is void as contrary to public

policy. This idea that the "clearly expressed intention" of the "freely
contracting" parties must prevail has been reaffirmed in New York 2'
"4Levine v. Bank of United States, 132 Misc. 130, 229 N. Y. Supp. log (N.Y.
Munic. Ct. 1928).
" 5Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N.E. 782

(1920).

"0Common carriers, because they operate under government franchises and monopolies, have been held bound to accept the goods of a shipper and to charge a reasonable
rate for their services. See, e.g., Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R., I12 U.S. 331 (1884). See
note 35 infra.
17 33 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-8 (Purdon 1949).
18 Ibid.
19Calamita v. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank,
35 Conn. 3z6, 330, 64 A.2d 46, 49 (949).
2025s N.Y. 152, 167 N.E. 203 (199), noted in 5 CORNELL L. Q. 256 (1930),

L. REv. 172 (1930), 29 COLUM. L. REV. 115o (929), 39 YALE L.J. 54z
(1930).
" Pyramid Musical Corp. v. Floral Park Bank, 268 App. Div. 783, 48 N.Y.S.2d
866 (2d Dep't 1944) (bank held not liable for inadvertent payment of countermanded
check because the stop order released it from such liability and evidence was insufficient
to show a willful disregard of notice) ; Edwards v. Nat'l City Bank of New York,
14 MINN.
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and has been sanctioned by the courts of Indiana22 and Pennsylvania.2 3
Not all courts, however, have followed this pattern. In Hiroshima
v. Bank of Italy24 the California Court of Appeals declared such releases to be against public policy, relying largely upon two sections of
the California Civil Code, one of which prohibits a person from contracting out of liability for his own fraud, willful or negligent violation
of law, or willful injury to person or property 2 5 and the other of which
nullified all contracts which attempted to 'Set the damages for a breach
of an obligation in advance of the breach. 26 Writers seeking to distinguish the case have seized upon the questionable application of the
statutes, pointing out that they are not directed against an attempted
exculpation from mere negligence.2 7 The Hiroshima case has also been
distinguished by virtue of the fact that the depositor there could neither
read nor write English, and its ratio decidendi has accordingly been
held inapplicable by an Indiana court where a depositor has had an opportunity to examine the form and "assent" to the release. 2' The California courts have nevertheless consistently followed this case, specifically reiterating its policy basis.2
Nor does California stand alone in this regard. The Ohio court had
repeatedly asserted that releases in stop-payment order forms would
be given effect, but that there would be no relaxation of the standards of
good faith and reasonable care not to pay a check after receiving a
countermand.' Recently, however, in Speroff v. First-Central Trust
zSo Misc. 8o, 269 N.Y. Supp. 637 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1934) (where bank certified
check after receiving a stop order which contained a release for inadvertent payment,
a triable issue was held to exist as to whether the check was certified inadvertently or

willfully).
Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind.App. 342, 183 N.E. 488 (5932).
Here, the bank
was held not liable to the depositor for a negligent payment of a countermanded check
for the reason that the depositor asked to have payment stopped "as an act of courtesy
.-Cohen v. State Bank of Philadelphia, 69 Pa. Super. 40 (1917).

only and in consideration therefor release[d] the [bank] from any liability. ....
"
for negligent payment. The court felt that since the depositor was not required to use
the stop-payment form, he could not complain of its terms.
-' 78 Cal.App. 362,
248 Pac. 947 (926).
" CAL. Civ. CODE § i668 (Deering 1949).
20 1d., § Y670.
-7See, e.g., Comm'ent, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 46 (19z6).
2"Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind.App. 342, 183 N.E. 488 (932).
-s See, e.g., Grisinger v. Golden State Bank of Long Beach, 92 Cal. App. 443, 268
Pac. 425 (1928).
'0 Hough Ave. Savings & Banking Co. v. Anderson, 78 Ohio St. 341, 85 N.E. 498

(xgo8). But cf. John H. Mahon Co. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank of Columbus, 6z Ohio
App. z61, 23 N.E.ad 638 (1938) (bank held not liable for payment of countermanded
check because depositor gave it wrong check number).
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Co., 31 it made its position more explicit by uncategorically holding that
any exculpatory provision purporting to relieve a bank from liability for
its own negligence is against public policy and therefore void." This
maintenance of an absolute duty of care was further said to be dictated
by the reciprocal rights and obligations inherent in the relationship between a bank and its depositors.3 And in the recent case of Reinhardt
v. Passaic-Clifton National Bank and Trust Co.,3 4 the New Jersey
court, after having declared an exculpatory clause invalid for want of
consideration, examined the merits of the rule which denies validity
to such releases. It observed that, while perhaps in legal contemplation
the bank and depositor might stand upon equal footing, a recognition
of modern day realities would suggest a contrary conclusion. It felt
that banks have been entrusted with an important franchise to serve the
public-a franchise analogous to that under which public carriers operate; and it finally concluded that it might not be inappropriate to apply
to banks the same legal doctrines which had deprived carriers of the
power to impose and invoke such exculpatory provisions3 ' The same
policy considerations incited the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
Thomas v. First National Bank of Scrnton,3 to overrule a long line
of contrary decisions and to invalidate a release in a stop-payment order.
Of course, other factors must be weighed in determining the effect
to be given these exculpatory provisions, one of the strongest of which
is the difficulty faced by large modern banks in carefully .xamining a
long list of stop-payment orders every time a check is presented for
payment. It has been said that to discover every countermanded check
is virtually impossible-but it would be a novel proposition indeed that
a bank choosing to assume the proportions of a large business should
1349

Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E.zd ii9 (1940).
"Id. at 419, 79 N.E.zd z2z (1948).
33 Ibid.
3' 16 N.J. Super. 430, 84 A.2d 741 (1951), aff'd, 9 N.J. 607, 89 A.zd 242 (1952).
35 16 N.J. Super. 430, 436, 84 A.2d 741, 744. The historic rule that a common
carrier cannot contract out of liability as an insurer of the goods shipped is said to rest
primarily on a policy dictated by the recognized inequality of bargaining power between
carrier and shipper. See Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889).
Under present federal law, however, a carrier can minimize its burden by offering lower
rates to shippers who wish to ship goods under a contract limiting the carrier's liability
to a set minimum sum. 34 STAT. 593 (.906), 49 U.S.C. § zo (11) (946); See Adams
Express Co. v. Croninger, z6 U.S. 491 (1953). Such a contract is enforceable be-

cause the arrangement meets both the consideration and the inequality of bargaining
power arguments. It is suggested that a similar arrangement could be effected in the
banking field. See text at note 46 et seg. infra.
"0376 Pa. 181, io, A.zd 91o (1954), reversing, 173 Pa. Super. 205, 96 A.zd

x96 (19s).
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escape the usual principles of law applicable to like institutions.3 It
might also be argued, purely upon the policies which underlie the law
of negotiable instruments, that a drawer should bear the risk of payment
of a countermanded check as the party primarily responsible for putting
it into circulation. This would accord with the askance with which the
law has traditionally regarded that which impairs the ready circulability of instruments drawn in negotiable form.8 8 But it would be
erroneous to contend that the practice of stopping payment on checks
can be discouraged only by allowing the banks to relieve themselves of
liability for negligent payment. The drawer's liability to a holder indue course of any check upon which payment is even justifiably stopped39
and his liability to the payee or a non-holder in due course of a check
upon which payment is unjustifiably stopped, 40 are themselves formidable impediments to its reckless use. Furthermore, where payment
might justifiably be stopped, without a fully effective stop-payment
order right, an injured drawer, in order to recover from a fraudulent
payee, might have to track him down and bear all of the burdens of
litigation and execution. Effective stop-payment, on the other hand,
would put the burden of litigation on a fraudulent payee and perhaps
eliminate its necessity entirely, inasmuch as confidence men seldom resort to the courts to recover the benefits of their bargains. Nor is this
possible reduction of litigation the only social benefit to be gained by
control of renegade checks by effective stop-payment orders; a stopping
of payment may afford a defrauded drawer his sole practicable means
of relief.4
The new Uniform Commercial Code4" propounds one solution to
the problems arising from stop-payment orders by flatly declaring that
banks may not by contract relieve themselves of their liability for a
failure to exercise due care in stopping payment on checks.4 3 The
"See Calamita v. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 329, 64 A.2d 46, 48
(x949). An entirely different approach was taken in Carroll v. South Carolina Nat'l
Bank, 211 S.C. 4o6, 45 S.E.2d 729 (-947), where the court found for the depositor
without passsing on the validity of the exculpatory provision in the stop-payment request
form. This was accomplished by holding that the bank had not met its burden of proof
as to whether the failure to stop payment was "mere inadvertence or oversight."
'a

BRIrrON, op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 2, 5.

°If payment is stopped when the check is in the hands of a holder in due course
and the bank pays the check, in an action by the drawer against the bank, the bank
is subrogated to the rights of the holder in due course. BRITrON, op. cit. supra note 6, §
xSi, at 839-40.
40 BRIrON, op.

"See

Comment,

cit. supra note 6, §199.
20 U. CHI. L. REV. 667 (1953).

"'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

"Id.

§ 4-103.

§§

4-1o3,

4-202.
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draftsmen comment that stopping payment is a service that depositors
not only expect, but are entitled to, despite the concomitant difficulty,
inconvenience, and expense to the banks. Accordingly, they observe
that the inevitable occasional losses incurred because of a failure properly to stop payment should be borne by the banks as a normal expense
of doing business. To the extent that such expenses are not covered
by the charge for the stopping of payment allowed by the Code, they
should be covered by bankers' insurance, the cost of which may be
spread among all depositors by the charges made for the accounts. 44
This method of handling the problem represents something of a compromise. On the one hand, the injustice of allowing the bank to relieve
itself of a liability inherent in its business is avoided; on the other, the
burden of such liability is recognized and methods of mitigating its
impact are indicated.
Another possible solution is suggested by the courts' treatment of
common carriers 45 to which analogy is frequently drawn in cases involving stop-payment orders. 4 Banks might be allowed to offer a
depositor a choice of three types of checking accounts-each with a different service charge scaled to the liability to which it exposes the bank.
One type could relieve the bank from any liability for negligent payment of countermanded checks; another limit the liability of the bank
to a set minimum number of checks; and a third leave intact the bank's
common law liability. The depositor would be free to choose the type
of account he desired and the bank would be adequately compensated
for the degree of liability which it might assume.
The availability of these possible compromises, together with a few
recent judicial statements, indicate that a trend denying validity to exculpatory provisions in stop-payment order forms has begun. It is
submitted that the trend is in the right direction. Suggestions such as
that presented by the draftsmen of the Code and the limited, liability
formula furnish adequate protection for the banks as well as depositors,
and represent a more socially satisfactory approach to the problem.
FRED H. STEFFEY
Ia., § 4-202, comment 2.

"See note 35 supra.
'a See, e.g., Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 16 N.J. Super.
430, 84 A.zd 741I (195.), aff'd, 9 N.J. 607, 89 A.2d 242 (1952); Thomas v. First
Nat'l Bank of Scranton, 376 Pa. iS1, io A.zd 9io (1954), reverslng, 173 Pa. Super.
205, 96 A.zd 196 (1953).

